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An illustration commemorating the anniversary of Psychological Operations. The U.S. Army creates promotional
graphics for social media platforms. (Spc. Eric Pargeon/U.S. Army)
Great power competition will require force protection for our minds, as hostile near-peer
powers will seek to influence U.S. troops. Influence campaigns can undermine the American
will to fight, and the injection of misinformation into a cohesive fighting force are threats
equal to any other hostile and enemy action by adversaries and terrorists. Maintaining the will
to fight is key to mission success.
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Influence operations and disinformation campaigns are increasingly becoming a threat to the
force. We have to treat influence operations and cognitive attacks as serious as any violent
threat in force protection. Force protection is defined by Army Doctrine Publication No. 3-37,
derived from JP 3-0: “Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of
mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and
infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational
area.”
Therefore, protecting the cognitive space is an integral part of force protection.
History shows that preserving the will to fight has ensured mission success in achieving
national security goals. France in 1940 had more tanks and significant military means to
engage the Germans; however, France still lost. A large part of the explanation of why France
was unable to defend itself in 1940 resides with defeatism. This including an unwillingness to
fight, which was a result of a decade-long erosion of the French soldiers' will in the cognitive
realm.
In the 1930s, France was political chaos, swinging from right-wing parties, communists,
socialists, authoritarian fascists, political violence and cleavage, and the perception of a
unified France worth fighting for diminished. Inspired by Stalin’s Soviet Union, the
communists fueled French defeatism with propaganda, agitation and influence campaigns to
pave the way for a communist revolution. Nazi Germany weakened the French to enable
German expansion.
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Under a persistent cognitive attack from two authoritarian ideologies, the bulk of the French
Army fell into defeatism. The French disaster of 1940 is one of several historical examples
where manipulated perception of reality prevailed over reality itself.
It would be a naive assessment to assume that the American will is a natural law unaffected by
the environment. Historically, the American will to defend freedom has always been strong;
however, the information environment has changed. Therefore, this cognitive space must be
maintained, reignited and shared when the weaponized information presented may threaten it.
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In the Battle of the Bulge, the conflict between good and evil was open and visible. There was
no competing narrative. The goal of the campaign was easily understood, with clear
boundaries between friendly and enemy activity. Today, seven decades later, we face
competing tailored narratives, digital manipulation of media, an unprecedented complex
information environment, and a fast-moving, scattered situational picture.
Our adversaries will and already are exploiting the fact that we as a democracy do not tell our
forces what to think. Our only framework is loyalty to the Constitution and the American
people. As a democracy, we expect our soldiers to support the Constitution and the mission.
Our force has their democratic and constitutional right to think whatever they find worthwhile
to consider.
In order to fight influence operations, we would typically control what information is
presented to the force. However, we cannot tell our force what to read and not read due to
First Amendment rights. While this may not have caused issues in the past, social media has
presented an opportunity for our adversaries to present a plethora of information that is
meant to persuade our force.
In addition, there is too much information flowing in multiple directions to have centralized
quality control or fact checking. The vetting of information must occur at the individual level,
and we need to enable the force’s access to high-quality news outlets. This doesn’t require any
larger investment. The Army currently funds access to training and course material for
education purposes. Extending these online resources to provide every member of the force
online access to a handful of quality news organizations costs little but creates a culture of
reading fact-checked news. More importantly, the news that is not funded by click baiting is
more likely to be less sensational since its funding source comes from dedicated readers
interested in actual news that matters.
In a democracy, cognitive force protection is to learn, train and enable the individual to see the
demarcation between truth and disinformation. As servants of our republic and people, leaders
of character can educate their unit on assessing and validating the information. As first initial
steps, we must work toward this idea and provide tools to protect our force from an assault in
the cognitive domain.
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